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This study uses stakeholder theory to explore how corporate governance [CG] characteristics 
influence corporate social responsibility disclosure [CSRD] in the context of a global financial 
crisis [GFC]. Empirical data are drawn from Portugal, a country strongly affected by the GFC. 
Portuguese companies are characterized by high ownership concentration. The largest 
shareholder is often the CEO and Board Chair (a phenomenon known as CEO duality). We 
analyse the association between CSRD (measured by a 40-item disclosure index) and CG 
variables (board size, CEO duality, board independence, ownership concentration and presence 
of an audit committee or CSR committee) for 48 of the 51 listed companies in Portugal. The 
control variables are company size and industry type.  
 
We find that CSRD is affected positively by board size, CEO duality, company size and industry 
type. This accords with suggestions implicit in stakeholder theory that a larger board will 
represent a broader diversity of stakeholders and will promote better monitoring, more assertive 
stakeholder management, greater transparency, and increased levels of CSRD. Larger companies 
and companies close-to-consumers are associated with high levels of CSRD, ostensibly because 
they are more visible and subject to greater societal monitoring during a period of financial 
crisis. We reveal that in a country characterized by high ownership concentration, CEO duality 
has a positive effect on CSRD.  
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1. Introduction 
The overriding objective of business activity has evolved from a classical, largely unfettered 
quest for profit maximizing, to one of seeking profit in a socially responsible way. In a period of 
ongoing global financial crisis (GFC) in some European countries (such as Portugal, Greece and 
Spain, where the effects were pronounced and are on-going), this evolution has directed keen 
attention to the efficacy of Corporate Governance (CG) mechanisms and the extent and quality 
of Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure (CSRD) practices. 
 
A company board of directors is responsible for instituting appropriate mechanisms to monitor 
and control company activity. The board is responsible also for a company’s accountability and 
transparency through information disclosure. Boards have collective obligations to a wide range 
of stakeholders. However, there has “been little research linking corporate disclosure to 
governance structures” (Akhtaruddin et al., 2009, p.1). As a consequence, there is a strong need 
to examine the influence of board composition on CSR activity and CSRD (Rao & Tilt, 2015). 
Involvement in CSR, and associated disclosures, stems from board decisions (Ho & Wong, 2001; 
Gul & Leung, 2004; Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; Cheng & Courtenay, 2006). Nonetheless, 
knowledge of how the CG characteristics of boards influence CSRD is under-developed (Khan et 
al., 2013).  
 
One shortcoming in the CG and CSRD literature is the low-level of research in the context of 
economic and financial crises. This is something the present study addresses. We use stakeholder 
theory to explore how CG characteristics influence CSRD (Snider et al., 2003). The contextual 
lens for doing so is Portugal, a small developing European Latin country that was affected 
strongly by the GFC. Portugal is characterized by high ownership concentration and high levels 
of “CEO duality” (that is, situations where the largest shareholder is also the CEO and Chair of 
the board).  
 
We find that companies with large boards and CEO duality are associated with higher levels of 
CSRD. This can be explained by large boards (usually representing a wider range of 
stakeholders) operating to promote CSRD. We find that CEO duality is correlated negatively 
with board size, company size, and the existence of an audit committee or a CSR committee. 
Thus, it appears that CEO duality enhances CSRD in smaller companies with smaller boards and 
no audit committee or CSR committee. We find also that large companies who are close-to-
consumers engage in higher levels of CSRD. These results are consistent with a view that 
community pressures encourage companies to focus on activities that benefit a wide range of 
stakeholders and the broader society. This seems particularly true in the context of a severe 
financial crisis. 
 
Section 2 outlines CG rules in Portugal. Section 3 presents the theoretical framework of the study 
– one that focuses on the relationship between CG and CSRD from a stakeholder theory 
perspective. The ensuing sections develop hypotheses, describe research method, present results, 
offer conclusions, and suggest areas for future research. 
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2. Institutional and Regulatory Background 
 
Portugal has a highly concentrated universal bank system, and a very small capital market 
(Lopes & Rodrigues, 2007). It has sustained severe on-going effects from the GFC (which 
commenced in the US in 2007). In May 2011, the International Monetary Fund, European Union, 
and Portuguese government, established an Economic and Financial Assistance Program to 
redress budget austerity and economic pessimism and to restore the confidence of international 
investors in Portugal. There have been continuing (but weakly effective) policy initiatives to 
promote competitiveness and sustainable growth in the economy (Dias et al., 2016).  
 
The main principles and rules relating to CG in Portugal are contained in the Commercial 
Companies Code (Código das Sociedades Comerciais, CSC) and the Portuguese Securities Code 
(Código de Valores Mobiliários, CVM). The CSC details the composition, competence and 
power of company boards and management, outlines supervision models and matters relating to 
independence, and describes information rights and rules for shareholder participation. The 
CVM stipulates the legal consequences for listed companies and highlights their duty to inform 
shareholders (Silva et al., 2006). 
 
Rules regulating CG by listed companies were introduced to Portuguese business practice mainly 
through regulations published by the Portuguese Securities Market Commission (CMVM) from 
1999 onwards, inspired by the OECD (OECD, 1999; Silva et al., 2006). In 2007, CMVM 
recommendations were converted into the first Portuguese CG code. In 2010, the CMVM’s CG 
Code became mandatory for listed companies. They were required to report annually on their 
compliance.
4
 In 2013, the Portuguese Institute of Corporate Governance (Instituto Português de 
Corporate Governance, IPCG) issued the first CG code prepared by a private entity (IPCG, 
2013), as an alternative to the CMVM’s CG Code. Since 2014, listed companies have been 
permitted to adopt whichever CG code best suits them, provided that the code is prepared by an 
approved institution (as is the case with the IPCG). 
 
3. Theoretical Framework 
 
In recent decades, irresponsible behavior by unscrupulous managers has increased the 
importance of CG, business ethics, trust, and accountability. This has led to wide acceptance that 
companies have formal and/or informal obligations beyond shareholders to a large set of 
stakeholders. 
 
A traditional view is that CG should deal “with the ways in which suppliers of finance to 
corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment” (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997, 
p. 737). From this perspective, CG is the act of protecting shareholders from expropriation by 
managers (Mitton, 2002). The change of emphasis from a “traditional shareholder-centric 
approach towards a more stakeholder-oriented approach to corporate governance” (Brennan & 
Solomon, 2008, p. 896) has opened CG to a broader definition. For example, the OECD (2004, 
p. 11) defined CG as a “set of relationships between a company’s management, its board, its 
shareholders and other stakeholders.”  
                                                                    
4
 In 2013, the CMVM published an updated version: CMVM Regulation 4/2013 CG Code. 
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Consequently, stakeholder theory is used increasingly to offer a more inclusive approach to CG 
(Solomon, 2007; Jamali et al., 2008). The stakeholder perspective maintains that because groups 
other than shareholders are affected by corporate activities, they must be considered in 
management decisions (Freeman, 1994). Thereby, business should be understood as a set of 
relationships among groups possessing a stake in the activities comprising the business 
(Freeman, 1994; Jones, 1995). Using the lens of stakeholder theory, CG is regarded as “the 
system of checks and balances, both internal and external to companies, which ensures that 
companies discharge their accountability to all their stakeholders and act in a socially responsible 
way in all areas of their business activity” (Solomon, 2007, p.14). 
 
CG has developed to involve some aspects regarded traditionally as part of CSR (Kolk & Pinkse, 
2010). In recent decades, there has been greater acknowledgement of the links between CG and 
CSR (Gray et al., 1995; Jamali et al., 2008) and stronger examination of a broader range of 
accountability and transparency mechanisms (Brennan & Solomon, 2008). To show a company’s 
social performance, the board of directors assumes a greater responsibility for defining CSR 
goals and CSRD practices (Roberts, 1992). Gray et al. (1995, p.53) were unambiguous in 
asserting that “we can understand CSR reporting as a part of the dialogue between the company 
and its stakeholders.” By providing CSRD, a company can legitimize its behavior and influence 
perceptions and expectations of stakeholders (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Jamali et al., 2008; 
Michelon & Parbonetti, 2012).  
 
CG drives executives to set goals and objectives relating to CSR (Jamali et al., 2008). In 
determining and promoting CSR targets, board structure and composition are key factors (Rao & 
Tilt, 2015). There is widespread acceptance that CSRD is part of the dialogue between a 
company and its stakeholders, and a major way to raise public awareness of CSR activities (Said 
et al., 2009).  
 
Stakeholder theory links CG and CSRD by suggesting that both should aim to enhance 
stakeholder engagement and organizational legitimacy (Michelon & Parbonetti, 2012). CSRD 
represents a strategic response to the expectations of society (Gray et al., 1995). Developing a 
corporate reputation through performance and disclosure is part of a strategic approach to 
managing stakeholder relationships.  
 
4. Hypotheses  
 
Board Size (H1)The size of a board of directors is often used to explain matters of CG and 
CSRD (Zahra et al., 2000; Akhtaruddin et al., 2009). Consistent with stakeholder theory, a 
board’s decisions relating to disclosure practices should balance the interests of all stakeholders 
(Kakabadse & Kakabadse, 2007). Representation on a board can provide stakeholders with 
beneficial input to board-level decisions (Owen et al., 2001) and help the board “respond better 
to the resource dependencies the company faces” (Ayuso & Argandoña, 2007, p.11). Thus, a 
larger board is likely to represent a wider range of stakeholders and promote the needs of 
additional groups of stakeholders. Because stakeholders usually request greater transparency, 
their wider representation is likely to have a positive effect on company disclosure policies. 
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Previous empirical studies of the relationship between board size and levels of CSRD have 
yielded contradictory results.
5
 These results could be attributed to the existence of a non-linear 
quadratic relationship between board size and CSRD, as suggested by Cormier et al. (2011). In 
view of this, we tested the possibility of a quadratic relationship between board size and CSRD. 
No statistically significant relationship was found. Given the contradictory nature of prior 
research, we formulated the following non-directional hypothesis: 
 
H1: Board size is related to the level of CSRD.  
 
Board Leadership (H2) 
 
A central CG issue is whether one person should hold the dual positions of board Chair and 
company CEO (Ho &Wong 2001; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Al Mamun et al., 2013). Duality is 
argued to be beneficial because it provides a unified command structure and consistent 
leadership direction, thereby enhancing decision-making, rapid implementation of operational 
decisions, and company performance (Vo, 2010). A competing view is that a person who is 
simultaneously CEO and Chair is more likely to advance personal interests to the detriment of 
the company (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). There is ensuing potential to decrease board 
independence and reduce the effectiveness and efficiency of board monitoring and controlling 
(Al Mamun, et al., 2013). However, Vo (2010, p. 127) cautions that “not every company that 
combines the CEO and Chair positions is a governance failure, and not every company that 
separates the CEO and Chair positions is a model of good governance.”  
 
Findings regarding the association between CEO duality and the level of disclosure are 
inconclusive. No association was reported by Ho and Wong (2001), Cheng and Courtenay 
(2006), Li et al. (2008), Said et al. (2009), Michelon and Parbonetti (2012) and Khan et al. 
(2013). Nonetheless, Chau and Gray (2002), Eng and Mak (2003), Gul and Leung (2004), Webb 
(2004), Huafang and Jianguo (2007), De Villiers et al. (2011), and Allegrini and Greco (2013) 
have reported a negative association between CEO duality and levels of disclosure. Al-Janadi et 
al. (2013) reported that companies with CEO duality provided more information than those 
without. As a consequence of these mixed findings, we propose a non-directional hypothesis. 
 
H2: CEO duality is related to the level of CSRD.   
 
Board Independence (H3) 
 
The appointment of directors who are independent of the CEO is claimed to be an important 
internal CG mechanism for effective board monitoring and control (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; 
Michelon & Parbonetti, 2012). Socially responsible companies tend to have boards with more 
outsider directors (Webb, 2004). This is thought to help ensure they pursue the broad interests of 
                                                                    
5
 For example, three Malaysian studies have reported mixed results: Said et al. (2009) found no significant results; 
Htay et al. (2012) found a negative association; and Akhtaruddin et al. (2009) found a positive association. In other 
settings, Rouf and Harun (2011) found the relationship between board size and disclosure was not significant. 
Similar results were reported by Ho and Wong (2001). Cheng and Courtenay (2006) argued that larger boards are 
associated with greater levels of information disclosure. Similar conclusions were reached by Byard et al. (2006), De 
Villiers et al. (2011), Rouf (2011), Rao et al. (2012), and Allegrini and Greco (2013). 
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shareholders and other stakeholders (Haniffa & Cooke, 2005). Ideally, independent non-
executive directors monitor the activities of executive directors. They are claimed to have a 
strong concern for the reputation of the company and its CSR programs (Zahra & Stanton, 1988).  
 
Empirical evidence of the effect of independent directors is mixed. Eng and Mak (2003) found a 
significant negative association between board independence and disclosure levels. Similar 
results were obtained by Gul and Leung (2004) and Huafang and Jianguo (2007). In contrast, Ho 
and Wong (2001) found no association between the number of outside non-executive directors 
and the level of disclosure. Given these contradictory results, we formulated the following non-
directional hypothesis: 
 
H3: The proportion of independent non-executive directors on a board is related to the level of 
CSRD. 
 
 
Board Structure (H4 and H5) 
 
Companies establish board committees to deal with a range of financial and strategic matters. 
Such committees help the board to respond to the expectations of stakeholders regarding 
effective conduct of the company. They offer assurance to stakeholders on accounting functions 
and accountability matters. 
 
The presence of an audit committee is reported to improve the effectiveness of monitoring and 
disclosure significantly (Ho & Wong, 2001; Arcay & Vazquez, 2005). The presence of an audit 
committee is reported to be correlated positively and significantly with the level of CSRD (Said 
et al., 2009; Al Shammari & Al Sultan, 2010; Khan et al., 2013).  
 
The establishment of a board CSR committee provides formal recognition that environmental 
and social impacts are under consideration and that there is an active strategic posture with 
regard to stakeholders (Ullman, 1985). A CSR committee is reported to improve the 
effectiveness of monitoring and the quality and quantity of CSRD (Michelon & Parbonetti, 
2012).  
We propose the following two hypotheses:  
 
H4: CSRD is related positively to the presence of an audit committee. 
 
H5: CSRD is related positively to the presence of a CSR committee. 
 
Ownership Structure (H6) 
 
Ownership structure is influenced by country-specific CG characteristics, including the maturity 
of the stock market, and the nature of state intervention and regulation (La Porta et al., 2000). 
Shareholder structures differ across countries. In the United Kingdom and United States they are 
characterized by dispersed ownership. In Continental Europe and Japan, it is common to find 
concentrated ownership, featuring large shareholders such as families and banks (La Porta et al., 
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2000). Different national dispositions to shareholding structures affect CG structure, CSR 
activities, and levels of CSRD.  
 
Where ownership is concentrated, management is likely to be pressured to respond to the 
interests of large shareholders, to the detriment of other stakeholders. The information disclosed 
is likely to reflect the interests of large shareholders and their preference to limit disclosure 
(Fathi, 2013). On the contrary, information disclosure is likely to be more effective in companies 
with dispersed ownership, especially when investors are concerned with a company’s broader 
social activities (Chan et al., 2014).  
 
However, it is also likely that to maintain company reputation, dominant shareholders will make 
decisions that maximize their company’s economic, social and environmental behavior (Prado-
Lorenzo et al., 2009). Thus, dominant shareholders, particularly family groups, will increase 
communication of CSR matters to the market because of their special interest in the long-term 
survival of the company (Anderson & Reeb, 2003). They know that investor confidence and 
market efficiency depend on the disclosure of accurate information about corporate performance 
(Jamali, et al., 2008).  
 
Findings regarding the relationship between ownership concentration and corporate disclosure 
are mixed. Cormier and Magnan (2003), Brammer and Pavelin (2006), Fathi (2013), Khan et al. 
(2013), and Muttakin and Khan (2014) reported that the extent and quality of disclosure is 
influenced negatively by a concentrated ownership structure. However, Haniffa and Cooke 
(2002), Chau and Gray (2002) and Huafang and Jianguo (2007) reported a positive relationship 
between ownership concentration and disclosure. No relationship was found between ownership 
structure and disclosure by Gul and Leung (2004) and Oliveira et al. (2011). Because 
shareholding structures in Portugal are characterized by the existence of large shareholders and 
high ownership concentration, we hypothesize that: 
 
H6: The level of ownership concentration is related to the level of CSRD. 
 
5. Research Method   
 
Sample and data 
 
We examined factors influencing CG and CSRD in 48 of the 51 Portuguese listed companies (we 
excluded three companies because they did not have an annual reporting period ending on 31 
December 2011). These 48 companies represented the following major industries: Industrial 
(31%), Consumer Services (19%) and Financial (17%). Because they included the largest and the 
most visible companies in Portugal, high levels of disclosure were expected (Gray et al., 1995; 
Bansal, 2005).  
 
We use “consumer proximity” to classify companies, in view of strong empirical evidence that 
industry classification based on “consumer proximity” explains differences in the quantity and 
quality of CSRD between listed companies in Portugal (Branco & Rodrigues, 2005, 2008; Dias 
et al., 2016). Companies with high consumer proximity are those that expect their name to be 
known by the final consumer (Branco & Rodrigues, 2008). We classify “high profile” companies 
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in terms of consumer proximity as are those in household goods and textiles; beverages, food and 
drug retailing; telecommunications services; electricity, gas distribution, water; and banks. “Low 
profile” companies are all other companies.  
 
CG data on board size, composition, leadership and ownership structure were collected from 
reports (mainly company annual reports) available in the Portuguese CMVM database. 
Information pertaining to financial statements and ownership structure were obtained from the 
Sabi - Bureau van Dijk Database (see www.bvdinfo.com). CSRD data were collected from 
annual reports, stand-alone reports, and company web sites. 
 
Dependent Variable   
 
Thematic content analysis (Krippendorf, 1980) was used to measure the dependent variable 
(CSRD). As with Gray et al. (1995), Haniffa and Cooke (2005), and Dias et al. (2016), we 
constructed an inclusive CSRD checklist (see Table 1). This comprised three CSR dimensions 
and 40 individual CSR indicators (5 economic, 20 social, 15 environmental) that allow a broad 
view of a company’s CSR.  
 
Choice of the 40 indicators was influenced by the world’s most widely used standards on CSRD, 
the GRI Guidelines (Larrinaga et al., 2008). We focused especially on the GRI core indicators 
that represent well established CSR indicators (Dias et al., 2016). The selected items were 
adapted to avoid penalizing companies that did not use the GRI model. Each item scored 1 if 
disclosed, and zero if not. No penalty was imposed if an item was expressly considered irrelevant 
by a company.  
 
For reliability and validity purposes, we repeated our coding procedures five months after the 
first coding, obtaining an 86% reliability measure (Cronbach’s alpha). The scores for each item 
were then added to derive a final score for each company. The approach to scoring is additive 
and equally weighted (Haniffa & Cooke, 2005). The final CSRD index (ICSRD) was calculated 
as follows: 
 
         e 
ICSRD = Σ ej / e  
              j=1  
where:  
ICSRD  = Index of CSR Disclosure  
ej   = Attribute analysis (1 if disclosure item is found, and 0 if not found)  
e   = Maximum number of items a company can disclose (40). 
 
Independent Variables  
 
The independent variables were measured as follows:  
Board Size (BSIZE)    = number of directors on the board. 
Board Independence (BIND)     = proportion of independent non-executive directors to total 
number of directors. 
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CEO Duality (CEOD)                = a dummy variable with the value of 1 if the CEO is also 
the Chair, and 0 otherwise. 
Audit Committee (AUDCom)  = a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the company has 
an audit committee, and 0 otherwise.  
CSR Committee (CSRCom)       = a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the company has a 
CSR committee, and 0 otherwise. 
Ownership Structure (OWNS)   = proportion of share capital held by the major shareholder. 
 
Control Variables 
 
The two control variables are Industry Type (INDST) (discussed earlier) and Company Size 
(LnSIZE). Company size is often considered to be a significant and positive variable associated 
with company disclosure (Hackston & Milne, 1996; Haniffa & Cooke 2005; Michelon & 
Parbonetti, 2012; Khan et al., 2013; Muttakin & Khan, 2014; Muttakin et al., 2015). Because 
larger companies are more visible and tend to be under strong stakeholder pressure, more CSRD 
is expected (Branco & Rodrigues, 2008). Consistent with Michelon and Parbonetti (2012), we 
measure size (LnSIZE) as the logarithm of total sales.  
 
Analysis 
 
Using Ordinary Least Square (OLS) multiple regression, we examined the relationship between 
explanatory variables and disclosure. Model 1 considers only the independent variables. Model 2 
introduces the two control variables. 
 
 
Model 1: 
 
it
ititititit
OWNS
CSRComAUDComBINDCEODBSIZEICSRD
εα
αααααα
+
++++++=
6
543210
 
 
Model 2: 
it
ititititit
INDSTLnSIZEOWNS
CSRComAUDComBINDCEODBSIZEICSRD
εααα
αααααα
++++
++++++=
876
543210
 
 
6. Results  
 
6.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 1 reports the frequency of disclosure for each of the 40 indicators comprising the CSRD 
index, disaggregated by CSR dimension (economic, environmental, and social). The economic 
dimension of CSR is the most reported (0.55), followed by the environmental dimension (0.51), 
and the social dimension (0.45). Sixteen companies had no CSRD. The total CSR index is only 
0.49.  
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Table 1: Frequency of CSR items / CSRD Index 
Dimension / Category Indicators                                                                                                 n %
Economic 
   0.55 
Economic Performance Direct economic value generated, revenues, operating costs, employee 
compensation, retained earnings, payments to capital providers, donations, taxes 32 0.67 
  Governmental financial assistance received 28 0.58 
Market Presence Policy & practices of spending on locally-based suppliers 26 0.54 
 
Procedures for local hiring 25 0.52 
Indirect Impacts Infrastructure investments & services provided for public benefit 22 0.46 
Environmental     0.51 
Materials Materials used 32 0.67 
  Recycled materials used 28 0.58 
Energy Direct energy consumption 30 0.63 
  Indirect energy consumption 27 0.56 
Water Total water withdrawal 32 0.67 
Biodiversity Location size of land in protected biodiversity value areas 17 0.35 
  Description of significant impacts of activities on biodiversity 14 0.29 
Emissions, Effluents, Waste Total direct & indirect GHG emissions 29 0.60 
  Other relevant indirect GHG emissions 27 0.56 
  Total water discharge 30 0.63 
  Total weight of waste 25 0.52 
  Total number of significant spills 11 0.23 
Products & Services Initiatives to mitigate environmental impacts products/services 24 0.50 
  Products sold & packaging materials reclaimed 28 0.58 
Compliance Significant sanctions for noncompliance with environmental laws 14 0.29 
Social   0.45 
Labor Practices       
Employment Total workforce by employment type or contract 32 0.67 
  Information related to new employee hires and turnover 26 0.54 
Labor Relations Employees covered by collective bargaining agreements 23 0.48 
Occupational Health/Safety Compliance with health & safety standards 27 0.56 
Training & Education Employee training  31 0.65 
Diversity/Equal Opportunity 
Composition of governance bodies & breakdown of employees  23 0.48 
Human Rights 
  
  
Investment, Procurement 
Practices 
Significant investment agreements & contracts that include clauses incorporating 
human rights concerns 29 0.60 
  
Information on significant business partners that have had human rights 
screening 22 0.46 
  Information on education of employees on human rights  19 0.40 
Non-Discrimination Incidents related to discrimination 12 0.25 
Freedom of Association & 
Collective Bargaining 
Procedures to identify operations in which the right to exercise freedom of 
association & collective bargaining may be at risk 15 0.31 
Child Labor Procedures to identify operations with significant risk for incidence of child labor 14 0.29 
Forced & Compulsory Labor 
Procedures to identify suppliers with significant risk for incidence of forced or 
compulsory labor 12 0.25 
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Society 
   
Local Community 
Operations to implement local community engagement & development programs 31 0.65 
Corruption Procedures to identify risks related to corruption 28 0.58 
Public Policy Info related to public policy positions 21 0.44 
 Product Responsibility 
 
  
Customer Health/Safety Info on safety & health impacts of products & services 23 0.48 
Product/Service Labeling 
Type of product & service info required by laws 18 0.38 
Marketing Communication Programs to adhere to laws, standards, & voluntary codes related to marketing 
communications 12 0.25 
Compliance Significant fines for noncompliance with laws & regulations concerning the 
provision & use of products & services 14 0.29 
TOTAL CSRD Index 
  0.49 
 
Values lower than 0.3 are presented by three environmental indicators (biodiversity, sanctions 
for non-compliance with environmental standards, number of spills) and five social dimension 
indicators (discrimination incidents, child or forced labor risk, marketing communication, fines 
for noncompliance with laws, regulations concerning the provision and use of products and 
services). The low levels of disclosure of these indicators can be justified by many companies 
because they do not apply to their operations. 
 
Descriptive statistics of the variables are reported in Table 2. The mean of the disclosure index 
for the entire sample is low (0.38). The range is 0 to 0.98. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
Continuous variables 
Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean St. Deviation 
ICSRD 48 0.00 0.98 0.38 0.38 
BSIZE 48 3.00 25.00 11.42 6.23 
BIND 48 0.00 0.63 0.20 0.18 
OWNS 48 6.56 99.85 41.66 23.72 
LnSIZE 48 8.07 16.65 13.16 1.96 
 
Categorical variables 
Variable N Dummy Frequency Percentage 
CEOD 48 1 (Yes) 25 52.08 
  0 (No) 23 47.92 
AUDCom 48 1 (Yes) 26 54.17 
  0 (No) 22 45.83 
CSRCom 48 1 (Yes) 11 22.92 
  0 (No) 37 77.08 
INDST 48 1 (High visibility) 19 39.58 
  0 (Low visibility) 29 60.42 
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Board Size varies between 3 and 25 persons, averaging 11.42. Although board size is not 
regulated in Portugal, the maximum value (25) is similar to that of many other European 
countries (23 in Belgium, 24 in Austria and Spain, 25 in United Kingdom, 27 in France and 
Russia) (Ferreira & Kirchmaier, 2013). The mean proportion of Independent Directors (20%) is 
below the CMVM recommendation (25%).  
 
The mean of ownership structure (41.66%) is high, consistent with Oliveira et al. (2011). CEO 
duality is present in 25 companies (52%). This can be explained, in line with the high ownership 
concentration, by the fact that families dominate many Portuguese listed companies (Lopes & 
Rodrigues, 2007). Twenty-six companies (54%) had an audit committee. Eleven companies 
(23%) had a CSR committee. Nineteen companies (40%) were classified as near-to-consumer 
(high visibility). 
 
6.2 Regression Analysis 
 
Before conducting regression analysis, we undertook bivariate analysis. The dependent variable 
(ICSRD) is correlated positively with Board Size (BSIZE), Board Independence (BIND), Audit 
Committee (AUDCom), Company Size (LnSIZE) and Industry Type (INDST) (at the 0.01 level, 
2-tailed), and with CSR Committee (CSRCom) (at the 0.05 level, 2-tailed).  
 
Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients indicated that multi-collinearity was not evident. 
None of the correlation coefficients was greater than the threshold level of 0.90 (Kennedy, 
1998). We used Tolerance and Variance Inflation factors (VIF) to test for multi-collinearity in 
the regression models (see Table 3).  
 
Table 3: Regression results 
Model         Beta        t           Sig. 
Collinearity statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant)  -2.052 0.047   
 BSIZE 0.636 4.550 0.000*** 0.610 1.640 
 CEOD 0.208 1.694 0.098* 0.791 1.264 
 BIND 0.133 0.979 0.334 0.646 1.548 
 AUDCom 0.102 0.713 0.480 0.583 1.716 
 CSRCom 0.077 0.609 0.546 0.738 1.356 
 OWNS 0.094 0.806 0.425 0.880 1.136 
2 (Constant) 
 
-4.135 0.000 
  
 BSIZE 0.336 2.455 0.019** 0.450 2.223 
 CEOD 0.303 2.856 0.007*** 0.748 1.338 
 BIND 0.156 1.362 0.181 0.642 1.558 
 AUDCom 0.057 0.465 0.644 0.565 1.770 
 CSRCom 0.014 0.127 0.900 0.699 1.431 
 OWNS 0.062 0.630 0.533 0.855 1.169 
 LnSIZE 0.437 3.558 0.001*** 0.559 1.788 
Dias, Lima Rodrigues and Craig | Corporate Governance Effects on Social Responsibility Disclosures  
 
15 
 
 INDST 0.205 1.844 0.073* 0.681 1.468 
Significant at the *** 0.01 level; ** 0.05 level; * 0.1 level 
 
Model  RSquare Adjusted RSquare F Value Sig. Durbin-Watson 
1  0.512 0.440 7.164 .000  
2  0.671 0.604 9.964 .000 2.341 
 
All tolerance values exceed 0.10 (Menard, 1995). The VIF for all independent variables are at 
acceptable levels (between 1.136 and 2.223), well below the threshold VIF value of 10 
(Kennedy, 1998; Haniffa & Cooke, 2005), indicating the absence of multi-collinearity. 
 
In Model 1 (examining explanatory variables only) R
2
 is 0.512, adjusted R
2
 is 0.440, and F is 
7.164 (significant at 0.001). In Model 2 (examining explanatory variables and control variables) 
R
2
 is 0.671, adjusted R
2
 is 0.604, and F is 9.964 (significant at 0.001). This suggests that a high 
percentage of the variation in CSRD is explained by variations in the whole set of independent 
variables. 
 
In Model 1, the size of the board of directors (BSIZE) is positive and significant at the 0.01 level. 
With the introduction of control variables (in Model 2), BSIZE is still significant, but now at the 
0.05 level. The results for Models 1 and 2 support H1. They suggest that a larger board will 
disclose more information than a smaller one. Similar conclusions are reported by Zahra et al. 
(2000), Cheng and Courtenay (2006), Byard et al. (2006), Akhtaruddin et al. (2009), De Villiers 
et al. (2011), Rouf (2011) and Rao et al. (2012). The result accords with suggestions implicit in 
stakeholder theory that a larger board will represent a broader diversity of stakeholders and will 
promote more assertive stakeholder management, leading to greater transparency and increased 
CSRD.  
 
CEO duality is significant at the 0.1 level in Model 1 and at the 0.01 level in Model 2, supporting 
H2, and suggesting that CEO duality increases CSRD. This is an important finding because prior 
studies have reported conflicting results. The majority of studies report a negative or non-existent 
association between CEO duality and CSRD. However, the results lend support to findings 
reported by Al-Janadi et al. (2013) that companies with CEO duality provide more information 
than those without CEO duality.  
 
The interpretation of results should take account of the high levels of ownership concentration in 
Portugal. The CEO is often the Chair and is frequently an important shareholder. The significant 
negative correlation between CEO Duality (CEOD) and Corporate Size (LnSIZE) (0.01 level) 
indicates that smaller companies, in which the CEO is also the board Chair, disclose more CSR 
information. This can be explained by argument that, in a period of financial crisis featuring 
strong concern by companies for stakeholder management (particularly in respect of community 
relations) (Dias et al., 2016), CEO duality strengthens the commitment the CEO and Chair to 
improve CSRD — and thereby, their company’s image with stakeholders (Jamali et al., 2008).  
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In line with stakeholder theory, managers will seek to gain and/or retain the support of all 
stakeholders, balance the competing interests of stakeholders, and maximize stakeholder interests 
over time. From this viewpoint, a strategic plan for managing stakeholder relationships might 
reasonably involve developing a company’s reputation for social responsibility — through 
performing CSR and disclosing CSR activities (Chan et al., 2014). 
 
If CSR activities are viewed as part of a company’s strategic management plan to meet 
stakeholder demands, it is reasonable to expect a positive relationship between CEOD and 
CSRD. A CEO who is also Chair can exert greater authority in making and implementing 
strategic decisions (Vo, 2010) – such as engaging in, and reporting on, CSR activities. A 
CEO/Chair will be mindful that a company’s stakeholders are likely to question the board’s 
independence and ability to control company decisions effectively and efficiently. In such a case, 
CSRD provides a convenient mechanism for the CEO/Chair to show that the board works in the 
best interests of all stakeholders, and thereby, to avoid pressure from society in a period of 
financial crisis. 
 
In Spain (like Portugal) boards are characterised by powerful executives (through CEO duality) 
and strong ownership concentration. In a study of the disclosure of strategic information by 
Spanish companies, Sanchez et al. (2011) found that disclosure was high in companies with CEO 
duality, and that the positive role of CEO duality “could be justified by the stakeholder model 
hypothesis, in which managers are not opportunistic agents but rather moral individuals and their 
role is seen as achieving a balance between the interests of all stakeholders” (p.492). Another 
possible explanation, is that CEO duality “provides the power and ability to shape the company 
in achieving its objectives and strategies because there is no intervention from one position 
holder or contradiction between the two positions” (Al-Janadi et al., 2013, p. 32). 
 
Company size (LnSIZE) (statistically significant in Model 2) suggests that larger companies 
disclose more information. This is consistent with research reported by Ho and Wong (2001), 
Haniffa and Cooke (2005), Rouf (2011), Michelon and Parbonetti (2012), Khan et al. (2013), and 
Muttakin et al. (2015) and points to the likelihood that larger companies give more attention to 
managing their stakeholders and have strategies to increase CSRD.  
 
Industry Type (INDST) (significant at the 0.1 level) suggests that companies closer to consumers 
are more visible and subject to public and media pressure. Thus, they have higher levels of 
CSRD (Bansal, 2005; Branco & Rodrigues, 2008; Dias et al., 2016).  
 
Board Independence (BIND), Ownership Structure (OWNS), Audit Committee (AUDCom), and 
CSR Committee (CSRCom), are not statistically significant. Thus, hypotheses H3, H4, H5 and 
H6 are not confirmed. In Portugal, independent board members are not very effective, consistent 
with Fernandes (2008). This possibly accounts for why BIND is not significant. AUDCom and 
CSRCom lose significance in the multivariate analysis because of the dominance of the board 
size variable. (BSIZE is correlated negatively with OWNS, and correlated positively with 
AUDCom and CSRCom). 
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7. Conclusions 
 
In a country characterized by high ownership concentration, CEO duality has a positive effect on 
CSRD – and stakeholder theory can explain this. CSRD was affected positively by two CG 
variables, board size and CEO duality; and by two control variables, company size and industry 
type. We conclude that larger companies, and companies closer to consumers, are associated 
with high levels of CSRD. Such companies are more visible and are subject to greater societal 
and media pressure. They are well-placed in terms of resources to adopt formal strategic policies 
and procedures with respect to CSR (Russo & Tencati, 2009). Larger boards incorporate a wider 
range of experiences and knowledge. Thus, they are able to represent a large spectrum of 
stakeholders by providing more CSRD (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Akhtaruddin et al., 2009).  
 
When the CEO is also the Chair of the board, there is greater concern for stakeholders 
(consistent with Sanchez et al., 2011, and Al-Janadi et al., 2013). Through CSRD, smaller 
companies with smaller boards (and no audit committee or CSR committee), can demonstrate 
greater accountability and transparency. The CEO/Chair is aware of stakeholders’ interests and is 
well placed to promote the CSR information stakeholders require. In the analyzed period of deep 
financial crisis for Portugal, a CEO who is also Chair has incentives to make the company appear 
modern and “in tune” with society. By demonstrating engagement in activities that promote 
long-run benefits for society, and minimizing the negative effects of their actions, CSRD helps 
companies maintain reputation and build a good relationship with stakeholders. 
 
Since different institutional factors or different legal requirements influence CSRD, it would 
seem beneficial for future research to explore other countries with different CG characteristics; 
examine the relationship between other CG factors (including gender) and levels of CSRD; and 
explore the relationships between CG and CSRD in non-listed companies.  
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